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Abstract
Antifragile systems grow measurably better in the
presence of hazards. This is in contrast to fragile
systems which break down in the presence of haz-
ards, robust systems that tolerate hazards up to a
certain degree, and resilient systems that – like self-
healing systems – revert to their earlier expected
behavior after a period of convalescence. The no-
tion of antifragility was introduced by Taleb for
economics systems, but its applicability has been
illustrated in biological and engineering domains
as well. In this paper, we propose an architecture
that imparts antifragility to intelligent autonomous
systems, specifically those that are goal-driven and
based on AI-planning. We argue that this architec-
ture allows the system to self-improve by uncov-
ering new capabilities obtained either through the
hazards themselves (opportunistic) or through de-
liberation (strategic). An AI planning-based case
study of an autonomous wheeled robot is presented.
We show that with the proposed architecture, the
robot develops antifragile behaviour with respect to
an oil spill hazard.
1 Introduction
How should an intelligent, autonomous system adapt to un-
foreseen situations? Answering this question has been the
focus of significant research effort over the last two decades
[Hayes-Roth, 1995]. However, the notion of adaptivity has
so far been limited to a system’s capability to cope with un-
known situations and return, at best to its original perfor-
mance. In this work, we argue that the presence of unforeseen
stressors, or hazards, offers a system an opportunity to self-
improve. Such self-improvement in the presence of hazards
is the central notion of antifragility.
The term antifragility was coined by Nicholas Taleb in his
book [Taleb, 2012], in which he argued that the opposites of
fragile systems are not robust or resilient systems, but sys-
tems that benefit from hazards and grow stronger as a result.
These concepts and their relationships are compelling and
have been illustrated in many domains such as economics, bi-
ology and engineering. However, the literature does not pro-
vide any suggestion towards formalization of the concepts,
due to which there are no concrete guidelines for design-
ing an antifragile system. In this paper, we address this gap
by formalizing the notions of fragility, robustness, resilience
and antifragility in the context of intelligent systems, in par-
ticular, for a large subclass of systems that are based upon
knowledge-based reasoning and AI planning. We show that
antifragile intelligent systems can be designed using a refine-
ment of MAPE-K (Monitor, Analyse, Planning and Execu-
tion - Knowledge), the autonomic architecture suggested by
IBM [IBM, 2005].
The paper is organized as follows. We briefly review some
background work on antifragility in section 2. Section 3 lays
out the scope of the current study, and describes our approach
towards introducing antifragility concepts into intelligent sys-
tems. Section 4 details the intelligent systems model fol-
lowed, and formalizes concepts of fragility and antifragilil-
ity in such systems. Section 5 proposes design modules for
antifragility, to be augmented to an existing autonomic com-
puting architecture of intelligent systems. In section 6, we
illustrate the developed concepts with the help of a robot path
planning example. We conclude in section 7 with some future
directions.
2 Related Work
Systems that degrade in behavior when acted upon by exter-
nal hazards (or, stressors) are known as fragile systems. Ro-
bust systems display tolerance to hazards upto a certain pre-
designed level, and show no change in performance. If the
magnitude of the hazard exceeds this level, system perfor-
mance rapidly degrades. An example of a robust system is
a building designed to withstand an earthquake of a particu-
lar magnitude. Resilient systems are affected by hazards, but
return to normal performance after a hiatus. Robust and re-
silient systems have been studied extensively as a means to
allow intelligent systems to cope with hazards [Russell et al.,
2015]; however, in such systems, the performance, at best,
retains its original behavior.
Taleb notes that certain systems, in fact, benefit from the
presence of hazards, and that these systems need to be distin-
guished from being merely robust or resilient. Such systems
abound in nature e.g., the immune system strengthens itself
upon encounter with an antigen and often retains the devel-
oped coping capability permanently [Monperrus, 2017]. An-
other example is muscular strength being developed by the
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stressor of exercise [Jones, 2014]. The increase in strength so
developed improves the capability of the muscle to perform a
wide variety of tasks many of which may be unrelated to the
exercise that initially triggered it. In environmental ecosys-
tems [Taleb, 2012], the presence of a hazard in the form of a
predator strengthens the surviving prey population, since they
learn from past experience.
Antifragile systems have been studied in the literature
in the context of communication systems [Lichtman et al.,
2016], infrastructure networks [Fang and Sansavini, 2017],
aerospace [Jones, 2014], health care [Clancy, 2015] and
cloud systems [Johnson and Gheorghe, 2013]. All of these
emphasize the following characteristics of antifragile sys-
tems:
• Such systems thrive in the presence of hazards, as op-
posed to robust systems that simply endure, and resilient
systems which merely survive and return to original per-
formance at best.
• Antifragile systems learn from failure to handle hazards;
the failure may be their own or of other members in a
population-based system.
• When acted upon by hazards, the system responds in
a fashion that improves its performance over time (not
necessarily immediately); the improvement is through
acquisition of new capabilities caused by deliberate
strategies by the system or through the opportunistic ex-
ploitation of certain attributes of the hazard itself.
The literature, in general, does not provide formal definitions
of the concepts of fragility, robustness, resilience and an-
tifragility. In [Lichtman et al., 2016], antifragility is demon-
strated mathematically for a particular hazard in a communi-
cation system, but the definitions are specific to the problem
and are not generic enough to be applicable to other systems.
3 Our Scope and Approach
In this paper, we wish to formalize the concepts of an-
tifragility in the context of intelligent systems. Specifically,
we consider the class of systems that are goal-driven and
based on AI planning. These systems have a fixed set of ac-
tions. Given goals and constraints, they attempt to achieve the
goals by deriving a sequence (called plan) from the available
actions and then executing the plan.
An intelligent system can be fragile because hazards en-
countered during execution may drive the system to states
from where it cannot find a plan to achieve its goals. If, on
the other hand, it is able to find an alternate plan to lead to
the goals no matter where the hazards drive it to, it is desig-
nated resilient. Note that if the system is able to find plans
that avoid the hazards altogether then occurrence of hazards
do not affect the plans - such a system is robust w.r.t. the haz-
ards. This is possible in many cases since most hazards are
localized (e.g. traffic jam, corruption of memory block).
A crucial point to note is that robustness and resilience
uses plans over actions available with the system. How-
ever, antifragile systems, by definition, must become stronger
when a hazard occurs. In the intelligent systems, we correlate
strength with available plans and take a position that a sys-
tem is stronger if there are more plans available. This can be
implemented by introducing new actions in the system. As
a consequence, a system that was fragile w.r.t. some hazards
may now become robust and/or resilient. This is consistent
with the observation in antifragility literature that new capa-
bilities introduce redundancy, which brings beneficial effects
through resilience and robustness.
Modeling the above notion of antifragility in the context of
intelligent systems has a difficulty. In the antifragility liter-
ature, new capabilities are introduced through external enti-
ties (e.g. medicine) or through realization of already existing
capabilities (e.g. exercise). However, the intelligent systems
that we consider have fixed sets of actions and do not have ac-
cess to any external source for new actions1. We ameliorate
this situation by partitioning the set of actions into visible and
hidden subsets. At any point of time, the plan synthesis algo-
rithms have access to only the visible subset. Actions can be
brought in from the hidden set to introduce new actions for
the planner. One can argue that such an approach is “artifi-
cial” because the system by default has access to all actions,
which results in the largest set of plans possible. However,
our approach is realistic and has a strong rationale: first, due
to the smaller visible set, planning is more efficient. More
importantly, there is a cost to support the planning and execu-
tion of actions (more sensors and actuators, more predicates,
larger state space). Therefore, it is advisable to consider only
a subset of the actions that are necessary in the current situa-
tion and enhance the subset only when in need (e.g. to handle
a hazard). This is accurately captured by the partition of the
actions into visible and hidden sets.
An antifragile intelligent system must therefore first decide
what actions are made visible, when and for what duration,
and then execute these decisions. We show that by suitable
refinement of the MAPE-K loop mentioned in the introduc-
tion, with refined action sets and appropriate modules, one
can obtain an architecture to design intelligent systems that
exhibit antifragility. In the rest of this section, we give some
details of the base MAPE-K loop.
Intelligent systems based on AI planning can be imple-
mented using the MAPE-K loop (see Fig. 2). It comprises the
Monitor, Analyzer, Planner, Executor and Knowledge mod-
ules orchestrated in a loop by the Autonomic Manager. The
Monitor module is responsible for gathering relevant state in-
formation from the resources to detect the events of inter-
est. This information is then used by the Analysis module
to determine if there is a need to change the current plan (se-
quence of actions) which is being executed. The change may
be necessitated due to a change in the goals of the system
or changes in the environment which force a course correc-
tion. The Planning module is then called upon to synthesize a
new plan for the changed goals/context. The Execution mod-
ule uses the generated plan to resume its execution. During
the monitoring of the environment and execution, the sys-
tem derives knowledge about the environment and possible
responses that it can store in a knowledge-base . This knowl-
1We note that the generalization to “open” intelligent systems is
certainly interesting, and we leave this direction for future work.
edge is used to derive faster and better responses as the system
continues to interact with the environment.
4 System Model
We model an intelligent systemA as a goal-driven, planning-
based agent interacting with an environment E . The inter-
action is specified as a game where the environment sup-
plies a goal and the agent tries to achieve the goal through
a plan (sequence of actions). Once a goal is achieved, the
environment supplies another goal and thus the game contin-
ues ad infinitum. During the execution of the plan, the envi-
ronment may change the state of the system nondeterministi-
cally, capturing the notion of hazards. The type of response
from A determines whether it is fragile, robust, resilient or
antifragile.
Formally, we have a finite set of boolean predicates Q, and
the system states S are defined as all valuations V : Q →
{true, false}. The environment E is specified through a set of
goal states G ⊆ S, goal transitions TG ⊆ G×G (also called
missions) and a set of hazard transitions H ⊆ S × S. For a
hazard (s, t), s is referred to as the hazard source and t the
hazard consequence. There is a special subset W of G called
the waypoints.
The intelligent system A is defined over of a set
of actions Act where each action is specified by a
〈precondition, effect〉 pair with precondition, effect ⊆ Q.
Act induces a deterministic labeled graph SAct with S as the
nodes and edges (s, a, t) when precondition(a) is consis-
tent with s and t = s ← effect(a) denoting the values of the
predicates in s being overridden by effect(a). A sequence of
actions P , is a plan for a pair of states (c, g) if starting at the
initial state c and applying the actions in P consecutively, we
arrive at the goal state g. The corresponding path is denoted
as path(P, c, g). We assume that the system has a special
reset action which moves it to one of the waypoints i.e. for
every state s ∈ S, there is a waypoint w ∈ W such that
(s, reset, w) ∈ SAct.
The minimal notations above are sufficient to define the
following concepts succinctly.
Definition A plan P for (c, g) is fragile w.r.t H if there is
state s on path(P, c, g) and (s, t) ∈ H such that there is no
plan P ′ for (t, g).
A plan P for (c, g) is robust w.r.t a set of hazards H , if for
all (s, t) ∈ H , s is not on path(P, c, g).
A plan P for (c, g) is resilient w.r.t H , if for all (s, t) ∈ H ,
s is on path(P, c, g) implies there is a plan P ′ for (t, g).
A fragile plan is one which goes through a state where a
hazard can occur and the from the hazard consequence state
one cannot achieve the intended goal state. A robust plan
completely avoids the states where hazards can occur. A re-
silient plan switches to another starting from the hazard con-
sequence state when a hazard occurs. These plans are illus-
trated in Figure 1 (in (b) the dotted path on the left corre-
sponds to a robust plan). One can extend these definitions to
the entire system.
Definition An intelligent system is fragile w.r.t H if there is
a mission (c, g) such that all plans for (c, g) are fragile w.r.t.
H .
Figure 1: Fragile, Robust and Resilient Plans
An intelligent system is robust w.r.t a set of hazards H if
for every mission (c, g), there is a robust plan w.r.t. H .
An intelligent system is resilient w.r.t. H if, for every mis-
sion (c, g), any plan P for (c, g) is resilient w.r.t. H .
Corollary 4.1 An intelligent system is not fragile w.r.t. H if
it is either robust or resilient w.r.t. H .
Robustness and resilience are independent concepts, i.e. a
system may be robust w.r.t. a hazard h because there is a
robust plan for every mission, but there may be other plans
which enable a hazard and are not resilient. Similarly, all the
plans for the missions may be resilient but there may not be a
single robust plan.
Fragility, robustness and resilience refers to a given system.
However, antifragility points to the capability of systems to
evolve from fragile to not fragile. This is how we define the
notion of “an antifragile system becomes stronger” due to the
occurrence of hazards.
Definition An intelligent system A is Antifragile w.r.t. a set
of hazards H if, A is fragile w.r.t H implies A eventually be-
comes either resilient or robust to H .
A corollary of the definition is that whereas there was no plan
for (t, g) for some hazard consequence t and goal g originally,
there needs to be such plan to have resiliency. Similarly, there
has to be new paths for some mission (s, g) to have robust-
ness. This implies there is a need to introduce new actions for
the agent.
As one can see, the definition of antifragility leaves a num-
ber of dimensions unspecified. When there is a hazard, if
there is no alternate plan, it does not specify whether the im-
provement through new actions should happen immediately
or at a future time, whether the improvement should be for
a limited duration (say, till the current goal) or permanent,
whether the improvement should be for the specific hazard
only or a related larger set. We note that such decisions de-
pend upon predictive capabilities of the system and cost con-
siderations that must be left for the designer.
5 Implementation
In this section, we describe the refinements for the MAPE-K
loop and also suggest some design decisions for the unspeci-
fied dimensions mentioned in the previous section as a guide
for system designers.
Figure 2: Intelligent System with MAPE-K Architecture
5.1 Knowledge
The Knowledge module (KM) has a set of actions. As
observed in Section 3, the key idea for introducing new
actions is partitioning the actions Act into 3 classes:
Acte(empowering), Actv(visible) and Acth(hidden). All ac-
tions a have an associated visibility predicate visiblea. The
membership of action a in Actv or Acth is determined by the
boolean value of visiblea in the current state. Visibility pred-
icates can be set to True only through empowering actions, or
by the hazards themselves, though they can be set to False by
all actions and hazards.
Apart from the actions, the knowledge base maintains a
history of hazards that have occurred and a set of visibility
predicates called internal goals. The latter are essentially the
predicates which can possibly be achieved through planning
and execution of empowering actions. Through this, the Man-
ager can make some of the hidden actions visible in the future
in a deliberate and strategic way.
5.2 Monitor
The normal role of Monitor in MAPE-K is to access the cur-
rent state of the system and detect anomalies if any. Here,
the Monitor detects a hazard through the inconsistency of the
current state (c) and the desired precondition of the action-to-
be-executed. In case of a hazard, it records the hazard (e, c) in
the knowledge base, where e is the state that had been reached
after the execution of the previous action.
5.3 Analyzer
The design decisions we mentioned are mostly in the Ana-
lyzer module. The Analyzer refers to the history of the haz-
ards, domain knowledge including cost etc (which could be
based upon analytics, for example, and taking into account
the impact of the hazard on the achievement of the current
goal) and outputs the following in the event of a hazard:
1. It first determines a set of hazards (including the present
one) that needs to be handled, by predicting and/or cor-
relating with the present hazard.
2. It outputs for each hazard a three-tuple 〈W,D,M〉
where W denotes immediate or future improvement
({Now, Later}), D denoted duration of improve-
ment ({Current, All}) and M denotes mode of han-
dling({Robust, Resilient})
Note that the 〈W,D,M〉’s are only recommendations. The
system will “improve” for any value of M. W denotes that
the urgency of improvement and D controls whether the new
actions are necessary for longer term.
5.4 Planner
Given the current state, a goal state, set of actions, a set of
hazards and the recommendation from the analyzer, the Plan-
ner synthesizes a plan using only the visible actions. First,
it determines the current state space from the predicates used
in Actv . Note that since Actv is dynamic, the state space
also changes dynamically. It is expected that the Monitor can
query the environment and find the correct current state at
any level of detail (e.g. accessing the appropriate sensors and
processing modules outputting the predicates).
Plan synthesis may fail because of several reasons. All of
visible or hidden actions may not be sufficient to provide new
plans. This is a pathological case where external support is
mandatory. There may not be plans satisfying the recommen-
dation in which case the best effort improvement is done. For
example, if a robust plan cannot be found, the Planner tries
to find a resilient one. Or, if robust plan cannot be found for
all missions, it finds one for the current mission and so on.
Specific behavior depends upon Planner policies.
5.5 Executor
The Executor module is pretty simple: given a plan which
is a labeled sequence of transitions in Sact, it executes the
actions associated with the labels in the sequence order taking
help of the Monitor to detect hazards. If there is a hazard,
the Executor halts the execution, signals the Manager that a
hazard has taken place and appends the hazard to the history
in the knowledge base. In the best case, the Executor finishes
executing the plan without countering any hazard and signals
the environment about plan completion. The Environment
then can issue a new goal which is handled by Autonomic
Manager.
When the Manager decides to issue a reset action, it is is-
sued directly to the Executor. Just as it executes a plan, the
Executor executes the reset action which leads to a waypoint
(a special goal state). The reset completion signal to the En-
vironment allows it to continue the game with a new goal.
5.6 Autonomic Manager
Autonomic manager is essentially an orchestrator for other
components in MAPE-K, but has a greater role in antifragile
intelligent systems since the life cycle is no longer just a loop.
The reactive behavior of the Manager is as follows:
1. When E issues a new goal, Manager passes the goal
along with the Actv , corresponding current state, haz-
ards and 〈W,D,M〉 recommendations to the Planner for
plan synthesis.
2. When E introduces a hazard, the Manager gets the sig-
nal from the Executor. It invokes the Planner as in (1)
to first find if there is a resilient plan already in the cur-
rent SActv . If no such plan exists, then it invokes the
Analyzer to get possibly a set of hazards H ′ with the
〈W,D,M〉 recommendations. For space reasons, as-
sume that there is a single hazard to be handled. The
case of multiple hazards is routine though tedious.
(a) Manager invokes Planner to use both visible and
hidden actions to come up with a plan P with mini-
mum number of hidden actions if possible depend-
ing upon mode M of the hazard h. If it is possible
to synthesize a plan, then it records the visibility
predicates Predv(h) of the hidden actions in P .
(b) If W==Later, then Manager issues reset to the Ex-
ecutor, but in a separate, parallel thread triggers the
Planner to achieve the visibility predicates and ex-
ecute the plan subsequently. This is so that during
the planning and execution for other missions, hid-
den actions are enabled gradually.
(c) If W==Now, then Manager triggers the planner to
first achieve Predv(h), which ensures new actions
in Actv and then invoking P for the current goal.
(d) If D == Current, then the visibility predicates are
toggled by the Manager as soon as the current goal
is achieved.
Thus, whenever there is a hazard, if there is a possibility of
having a robust or resilient system w.r.t. the hazard using
extra hidden actions, those actions are made visible. This en-
sures that whenever there is a new goal, the system is able
to find a plan (robust or resilient) for the goal. Note that for
completely different goals, the system may not find robust/re-
silient plans in SAct, hence a similar exercise is carried out to
make more actions visible.
In the antifragility literature, it is noted that certain sys-
tems may perform better under hazards (e.g. adrenaline rush
enabling great strength in stress conditions). In a way, this
attribute is captured in our setup by the fact that a hazard may
lead to a state where certain visibility predicates are set to
True and hence the agent has access to (possibly) more num-
ber of visible actions for planning. On the other hand, build-
ing up resources to enable more strength or immunity is a de-
liberate process and this is captured by the internal planning
with empowering actions.
6 Case Study
We illustrate the concepts discussed in this paper within
a path planning scenario. We consider a wheeled robot
A autonomously navigating in its world (e.g., a warehouse).
The mission is split into a sequence of goals, with the next
goal being planned for once the current goal is successfully
achieved. Each goal is nothing but a position the robot has to
reach on a sparse 5×6 grid of equally sized cells.
In a simplistic scenario, the robot has the following visi-
ble actions: MOVE and TURN using which it navigates the
sparse grid. Traditional path planning is used to compute the
optimal sequence of actions that take the robot from an initial
position to the given goal. The robot’s behavior also has two
other actions smallMOVE and smallTURN. These two are
initially not visible (hidden actions). These two require ad-
ditional support from the environment during execution, for
example they need sensors to locate the robot on a finer grid.
Therefore we assume additional empowering actions are typ-
ically needed before one can use these hidden actions; the
preconditions for these actions account for that requirement
through appropriate predicates.
During execution, A follows the computed plan. An oil
spill, unknown at the time of planning, is encountered, which
throws the robot off the planned path and hence the original
plan is not applicable (shown by point (1) in Figure 3(b)).
Thus the robot discovers it has encountered a hazard.
The Autonomic Manager now uses external information
(camera images, image analytics etc.) to identify that the
hazard is an oil spill and uses domain knowledge to derive
the fact that MOVE and TURN actions cannot be used in the
oil spill. Therefore it makes these actions Hidden, and sets
the visibility predicates of smallMOVE and smallTURN as
an internal goal. The Planner uses the prerequisite empower-
ing actions to prepare the current state and ultimately makes
the smallMOVE and smallTURN actions visible. The robot’s
domain view when these actions are enabled is shown in Fig-
ure 3(b). To support this world view, note that the environ-
ment needs to be able to provide the right kind of sensory
information (e.g., fine grid positions).
For the purposes of this illustration, we assume that
smallMOVE and smallTURN actions are deterministic and
have the intended effect2. Various possibilities exist for re-
planning with these additional actions and it depends upon
the Planner. As shown in Figure 3(b), the robot can navigate
from within the oil spill, with smallMOVE and smallTURN
actions to a known state on the earlier plan (red path), it can
come out of the oil spill as early as possible and then navigate
the the known state (yellow path) and it could directly find
the a path to the current goal, abandoning the earlier plan. As
we have mentioned, getting out of the oil spill may be treated
as a hazard as a response to which MOVE and TURN actions
be made visible, and the robot now has all the four actions at
its disposal for planning the new paths.
Figure 4 shows a second goal sequence after the first goal
has been successfully reached. We note that the path avoids
known oil spills, due to the awareness of this new entity in
the environment. While following the path, a new oil spill
that did not exist at plan-time may be encountered. In this
case, the robot uses its newly visible actions to easily cope.
In Figure 4, the red curve (4) shows the path using these new
capabilities. We also note that these new actions may also be
used as planned actions to navigate through known oil spills
even at original plan time possibly resulting in a lower cost
path. Thus in reaching the second goal if the red oil spill
was known, it could still have chosen the path through the oil
spill, the blue line - (5), using the newly visible actions for
this stretch appropriately.
As mentioned in the Implementation, Analyzer with the
help of Knowledge module can generalize the specific oil
spill hazard to other hazards such as ice, slippery sand etc.
2A reasonable assumption when referring to sufficiently small
steps on slippery surfaces.
(a) Originally planned path (b) Hazard mode triggered by oil-spill hazard
Figure 3: Robot path planning example: first goal sequence
Figure 4: Robot path planning example: second goal sequence
by identifying that the hazard consequence state is similar
and also from the knowledge that these surfaces have similar
properties. With this, similar uncovering of hidden actions
can be done for all such hazards. This shows the dimension
of the antifragile architecture where occurrence of one hazard
builds antifragility for a class of other hazards.
This illustrative example has shown that it is possible for
an intelligent system to develop antifragility through the sug-
gested refinements and suitable design decisions in the base
MAPE-K architecture.
7 Summary and Further Work
In this paper we have defined antifragility in the context of
intelligent systems which are goal-directed and based on AI
planning. We have shown that antifragile intelligent systems
can be built using the MAPE-K architecture though with sev-
eral additional features. Primarily, the available action set
should be divided into empowering, visible, and hidden sub-
sets. Depending on the strategy of the Autonomic Manager
module, the system is made robust or resilient to the haz-
ard in different manners, correctly capturing the essence of
antifragility. The proposed architecture has been illustrated
through a robotics path planning example, where a robotic
agent A performs better after encountering a hazard.
One immediate problem arises that must be studied: that of
optimization of the selection process through which hidden
actions are made visible. Efficiency of algorithms to select
the minimal number of new actions that will allow robust-
ness/resilience is critical from the view of real-time systems.
We observe that the improvement of the systems is trig-
gered by hazards in antifragility literature. In an indirect way,
by defining hazards as any violation of cost metrics, one can
bring in improvements through new actions that will result
in more efficient plans even though the system does not en-
counter “unforeseen” hazards. The simian army in [Abid et
al., 2014] used to inject faults and create hazards to improve
the systems is similar in spirit.
We note that this work is an initial effort to study the con-
cept of antifragility in the context of intelligent systems, and
therefore is rather preliminary. Undoubtedly, rigorous imple-
mentation and verification of the developed ideas is needed.
In addition, the notion of performance improvement from an-
tifragility, albeit intuitively true, must be quantified in the cur-
rent context. We believe that the real value of building an-
tifragile systems will become evident as we develop complex
multi-agent systems. Therefore, distributed antifragility, built
into a population of systems, is an interesting future direction.
The potential applications of a system that improves from the
presence of hazards is vast. We hope that the promise of
antifragile intelligent systems will stimulate further research
within the intelligent systems community.
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